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CIVIL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL COURTS: CREATING A TWO-
COURSE SEQUENCE 
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
A student of mine once described Federal Courts (or Federal Jurisdiction, 
as the course is sometimes called) as “the love child of Civ Pro and Con Law.”  
As described in these pages last year,1 Federal Courts combines horizontal and 
vertical concerns for distribution of federal power with a concern for 
organization, structure, management, and operation of the courts.2  Part of that 
mix is the central theoretical and doctrinal theme of the basic structural 1L 
Constitutional Law course; the other part is the core of at least part of the basic 
1L Civil Procedure course. 
Civil Rights (or Civil Rights Litigation or Constitutional Litigation or 
Constitutional Torts3 or § 1983 Litigation) is the grandchild on this doctrinal 
family tree.  It takes the parent and mixes some remedies, criminal procedure, 
individual rights (distinct from structural) constitutional law, and 
employment/employment discrimination into the pedagogical DNA. 
Section 1983 was enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
Reconstruction-era legislation intended to enable Blacks and their supporters in 
the South to vindicate newly secured rights in the face of Klan control (or at 
least undue influence) over state governments and state courts.4  The provision 
creates no rights.  Rather, it provides a cause of action (a vehicle) for bringing 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.  My thanks to the 
editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium. 
 1. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 693 (2009). 
 2. Arthur D. Hellman, Another Voice for the “Dialogue”: Federal Courts as a Litigation 
Course, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 762–63 (2009). 
 3. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L. WELLS, & THOMAS A. EATON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (2d ed. 2004). Jack Beerman suggests that constitutional tort litigation 
refers to constitutional litigation, distinct from civil rights litigation under more recent 
enactments, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jack Michael Beermann, Qualified Immunity 
and Constitutional Avoidance, ___ Sup. Ct. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript 1 n.3). 
 4. See, e.g., Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 61 (2006). 
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claims to remedy deprivations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws”5 committed by any “person” acting “under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . .”6  An 
elaborate, technical, nuanced, detailed, and specialized body of legal rules 
(statutory, constitutional, and common law) has sprung up around this 
relatively sparse nineteenth-century statutory language. 
Federal Courts casebooks and courses typically touch four areas of core § 
1983 law: action under color of law,7 federal-official liability under Bivens,8 
municipal liability,9 and official immunities, notably executive qualified 
immunity.10  In addition, § 1983 and the process of litigating constitutional 
claims underlie significant Fed Courts topics, such as the Younger and Pullman 
abstention doctrines,11 the Anti-Injunction Act,12 the obligation of state courts 
to apply federal law,13 appealability,14 and state sovereign immunity.15  In 
 
 5. “Laws” refers to federal laws—primarily, although not exclusively, rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
520 U.S. 43, 50 n.3 (1997). 
 7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that police officers act under color of 
state law even when they violate state law, if clothed with apparent state authority); see, e.g., 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 947 (6th ed. 2009); 
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL, & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS 914 (2d ed. 2009); PETER 
W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL–STATE 
RELATIONS 1151 (6th ed. 2008); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: 
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 295 (4th ed. 1998). 
 8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971); see, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 726; HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 504; 
LOW & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 189. 
 9. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 
965; LOW & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 1206. 
 10. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800 (1982); see, e.g., HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 982; LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 7, 
at 1166. 
 11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971) (holding that federal courts cannot enjoin 
good-faith pending state criminal prosecution); R.R. Comm. Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 
501 (1941) (“These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system 
whereby the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their authority because of 
‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth 
working of the federal judiciary.”) (citations omitted). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to 
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”); Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972). 
 13. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 
911, 919 (1997). 
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short, § 1983 is a frequent (although not the sole) context in which the 
principles and theories of Federal Courts are put to work.16  These doctrinal 
rules determine the availability and success of § 1983 claims and judicial 
remedies for constitutional violations.  Additionally, they make complete sense 
only when considered in the fuller context of § 1983, as opposed to being 
additional units in the overall survey of federal jurisdictional doctrine and 
structural relations between Congress and the courts. 
Thus it is time to let the grandchild leave home and take its independent 
place in the law school curriculum.  There is too much to § 1983, doctrinally 
and normatively, for it to be given its due merely as part of a larger class on the 
work of the federal courts.17  Attempting to give § 1983 sufficient depth within 
the larger Federal Courts class detracts from coverage of other important 
subjects that students should engage with and likely will not encounter 
elsewhere in law school.  Civil Rights Litigation becomes “Applied Federal 
Courts,” taking the general doctrines and core principles and themes from the 
big course and applying them to a particular category of cases that forms a 
substantial portion of the business of federal courts.18 That application is best 
taught and learned independently and in detail in a distinct course. 
I am the only full-time faculty member at my current school teaching both 
courses, so I want to use this paper to explain how I divide the material and 
why it makes pedagogical sense to do so.  My goal has been to establish a two-
course sequence, in which Federal Courts introduces the big-picture doctrines 
and the principles of the federal courts, the issues that surround and determine 
federal judicial jurisdiction, and the range of issues and cases landing in federal 
court. Civil Rights then entails a beginning-to-end examination of 
constitutional litigation under § 1983 and Bivens, touching on many of the 
same doctrines, themes, and principles, but in the narrower context of one area 
of common federal-court litigation. 
 
 14. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 519, 526–27 (1985). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 159 (1908). 
 16. Michael L. Wells, A Litigation-Oriented Approach to Teaching Federal Courts, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 861–62 (2009). 
 17. The same is true for Habeas Corpus, both statutory habeas in which federal courts review 
state and federal convictions, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2006), and constitutional habeas that has 
been at the center of War-on-Terror litigation and the recent three-way power battle among 
Congress, the President, and the federal courts, although it cannot be covered in sufficient depth.  
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006).  Habeas is included in many Federal Courts casebooks.  See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 1153; LOW & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 804; REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 7, 
at 585. 
 18. CAROL KRAFKA, JOE S. CECIL, & PATRICIA LOMBARD, STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE 
RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 8 (1995), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rate_of_appeal.pdf/$file/rate_of_appeal.pdf (noting the 
increase in the proportion of civil rights cases). 
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The Law Journal dedicated last year’s teaching issue to Federal Courts.19  
It is appropriate, then, to use these same pages to consider this pedagogical and 
curricular off-shoot.  Rather than looking at what should be in a Federal Courts 
class and how the class should be taught, I want to focus on what should be 
excised from Federal Courts and spun into an independent course. 
I.  WHY CIVIL RIGHTS 
There are several reasons that Civil Rights Litigation deserves its own 
course (whatever we call the course).  First, there is the increased (and ever-
increasing) amount, complexity, and specialization of the material, both in 
Federal Courts generally and in the narrower course.  In the 2008–2009 Term, 
the Supreme Court decided a number of cases that warrant at least some 
mention in class discussions in a civil rights litigation course, and perhaps full 
treatment in subject casebooks.20  A two- to three-week cursory overview of 
some areas of § 1983 as part of a broader thirteen-week discussion of the 
business of the federal courts does not provide full coverage or put the material 
in its full context.  For example, most books include a major case on qualified 
immunity.21  But the proper approach to qualified immunity has changed twice 
in the last decade, demanding a significant expenditure of time to explore this 
evolution.22  And the significance of qualified immunity makes sense only in 
the overall framework of a civil rights action, particularly after consideration 
of whether a plaintiff had initially established a violation of her rights.  
Moreover, qualified immunity functions as the default defense when absolute 
immunities applicable to particular actors and particular conduct are not in 
play—but those other immunities typically are not covered in Fed Courts.23  As 
 
 19. See Fallon, supra note 1; Laura E. Little, Teaching Federal Courts: From Bottom Line to 
Mystery, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 797 (2009); Wells, supra note 16. 
 20. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct 2633 
(2009) (granting qualified immunity to school officials who conducted a strip search of a student 
suspected of possession and distribution of ibuprofen); Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 
___, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (rejecting § 1983 claim to obtain DNA testing); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (requiring intentional action to establish supervisory 
liability for First Amendment and equal protection claims); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 
___, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (applying absolute prosecutorial immunity to policy decisions by 
heads of prosecutor office); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) 
(establishing standard for qualified immunity); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 
___, 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009) (holding that Title IX does not preclude § 1983 constitutional claim 
for same conduct). 
 21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819 (rejecting mandatory two-step, merits-first approach 
established in 2001 in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)); see also Beermann, supra note 3 
(manuscript at 2–3). 
 23. See Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859–60, (discussing scope of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (recognizing legislative immunity as 
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the law of § 1983 becomes more detailed and complex, it makes it difficult for 
Federal Courts professors to cover the material in sufficient depth or detail to 
have it make sense without taking time away from other general jurisdictional 
issues, which themselves remain the subject of constant attention, expansion, 
and development in courts and in Congress.24 
Second, Civil Rights is not one subpart of a broader discussion of 
Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the judicial process as it affects the 
general function of the federal courts.  Rather, § 1983 is a specific area of 
substantive federal law with its own elaborate body of substantive, 
jurisdictional, and procedural rules that puts those themes and principles into 
action. It is uniquely common business that many students will encounter in a 
range of professional endeavors.25  Some graduates will work as judges and 
many as federal law clerks, where § 1983 and Bivens claims comprise a 
significant portion of the docket.26  Others will work for various levels of 
government as lawyers, perhaps litigating civil rights claims on behalf of 
government and government officials.  Some will become plaintiff-side trial 
lawyers, with civil rights litigation forming a substantial (and potentially 
lucrative) part of their practice.27  Some might even find themselves as § 1983 
and Bivens defendants.28  All are well served by a dedicated course exploring 
the full scope of the doctrine and principles. 
The course I envision sounds much like the litigation-oriented approach to 
Fed Courts that Michael Wells described in these pages last year.29  Wells 
begins his class with the core § 1983 material that is the crux of my Civil 
Rights course, using it as a bridge to explore the academic and theoretical 
questions at the heart of the common Federal Courts curriculum, as well as 
more general federal jurisdictional doctrines (standing, federal common law, 
 
applicable to all levels of state and local government); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1992) 
(considering scope of judicial immunity). 
 24. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009) (discussing the obligation of 
state courts to follow federal law); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1143 
(2009) (considering whether a party had standing to challenge federal regulations); Constitution 
Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); Congressional Accountability for Judicial 
Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 25. See Wells, supra note 16, at 871–72 (arguing class time should highlight concepts 
students will encounter in real life legal practice). 
 26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 27. Unlike ordinary state tort litigation, § 1983 (and other civil rights statutes) offer the 
attorney fees for private plaintiffs’ lawyers whose clients prevail in litigation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b) (2006). 
 28. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 2009 WL 1651273, at *1–2, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying 
motion to dismiss in Bivens action brought by War-on-Terror detainee against former attorney in 
Office of Legal Counsel).  Obviously, defendants in actions implicating prosecutorial and judicial 
immunity will have gone to law school. 
 29. Wells, supra note 16, at 860. 
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federal question jurisdiction, etc.).30  By grasping the general principles of § 
1983, Wells argues, students gain the tools to grasp the power and reach of 
general Federal Courts principles in their real-world applications.31 
I share Wells’s view that § 1983—understood in practical, litigation-
oriented terms—is essential to understanding principles of federal judicial 
power and the function of the federal courts and vice versa.  And I join him in 
rejecting the notion that the particulars of § 1983 are comparatively less 
significant than broad principles or scholarly ideas.  But a distinct civil rights 
course provides the best of both worlds—the scholarly, ethereal, legal-process 
approach that defines the typical (including my) Federal Courts class, as well 
as the litigation-oriented focus on § 1983 which illustrates those principles in 
action.  It spreads coverage across two classes, leaving two full semesters to 
explore both theoretical and applied approaches and to give students the 
benefits of each. 
Third, federal litigation and the federal judiciary became significant 
enough to justify a stand-alone course and independent area of study only in 
the middle of the last century.  That change corresponded temporally with an 
increase in the amount and scope of substantive federal law, beginning with the 
New Deal and picking up speed with the Warren Court and the Great 
Society.32  Section 1983 is part of this substantive explosion.  Virtually all of 
the material covered in Civil Rights dates from the early 1960s forward.  
Congress enacted § 1983 during Reconstruction,33 but between 1871 and 1940, 
federal courts decided only twenty-one cases.34  Section 1983’s emergence as a 
meaningful part of federal law and the work of federal courts required several 
post-New Deal developments: (1) wide incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the Warren Court’s decision in Monroe 
expansively interpreting the concept of action “under color” of state law and 
recognizing § 1983 as a primary right of action in federal court, even as to 
conduct that might also violate state law;35 and (3) the Bivens decision ten 
years later recognizing a direct constitutional action for damages against 
 
 30. Id. at 861–62. 
 31. Id. at 867. 
 32. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
494, 512 (1986); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 284–85 (1989). 
 33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 204 (1961). 
 34. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (5th 
ed. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 35. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183; Myriam E. Gilles, Police, Race and Crime in 1950s 
Chicago: Monroe v. Pape as Legal Noir, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 41, 53–54 (Myriam E. Gilles 
& Risa L. Goluboff, eds. 2008). 
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federal officers.36  Judicial recognition of private damages litigation as a 
primary vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights37 made the study of that 
vehicle a necessary part of the law school curriculum.  The subsequent 
pullback on many important issues becomes fodder for further exploration of 
the substantive landscape.38 
Finally, although both courses touch on similar ideas, principles, and 
themes, their respective focuses differ.  As Arthur Hellmann argued in these 
pages last year, the focus in Federal Courts is structural and institutional; 
principles are examined from the point of view of Congress and the courts as 
“institutions of governance.”39  Federal Courts is primarily about the 
institutional relationships between Congress and the federal courts or between 
federal courts and state courts—when federal courts can and should act, when 
Congress can control when or how federal courts can act, and when federal 
courts can control what states or Congress do.  In discussing federalism and 
separation of powers, the material often speaks of federal “interests,” reflecting 
a concern for whether it is in the institutional interests of the federal 
government and federal law to have a class of cases in federal court and which 
federal institution gets to make that choice.40 
The theme in Civil Rights Litigation is individual—usually constitutionally 
based—rights and the process of enforcing and vindicating those rights.  The 
federal “interest” in having the case litigated and decided in federal court is 
less institutional and more individual, resting with the plaintiff whose 
constitutional rights allegedly have been infringed and who seeks judicial relief 
and remedy.  The concern is for the plaintiff and what she must do to vindicate 
her rights—what she must plead and prove in her case, what defenses and 
procedural hurdles she must overcome, and what remedies she may obtain if 
successful.41  There often is concern for bottom–line results—did the 
plaintiff/rights-holder prevail, and, if she did not, have her “rights been 
enforced?”  Does civil rights doctrine and practice match the theory that for 
 
 36. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971). 
 37. See id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or 
nothing.”); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. 
 38. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see generally Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  See 
also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Teaching Civil Rights with an Eye on Practice: The Problem of 
Maintaining Morale, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769 (2010). 
 39. Hellman, supra note 2, at 762–63. 
 40. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 (2006) 
(citations omitted); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–
14 (2005) (“It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction 
demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal 
interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”). 
 41. Infra Part II. 
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every right there is a remedy?42  To the extent it engages the same structural 
and institutional debates about the judicial role and the balance of power 
between Congress and the courts or between federal courts and state courts, the 
focus remains squarely on how those disputes affect individual-rights 
claimants and vindication of their constitutional liberties. 
Consider, for example, one topic covered in both courses—parity between 
federal and state courts and Burt Neuborne’s seminal article, The Myth of 
Parity.43  Parity provides the logical support for the various federal abstention 
doctrines.  The discussion of parity in Federal Courts is institutional—it 
considers the structural issues that distinguish federal from state courts and the 
federalist balance; the historical fact that state courts were (and were expected 
to be) primary courts of original jurisdiction and the structural-federalism 
concerns that raised; and the fact that concerns about state courts’ respect for 
federal law date to the Founding and early days of the Constitution, long 
before the Warren Court’s “rights revolution.”  The discussion in Civil Rights 
is narrower and exclusively modern: the question is whether parity exists for 
vindicating individual federal constitutional rights, what it means for courts to 
vindicate rights, and how concerns for individual (as opposed to structural) 
rights dictate forum allocation choices. 
It is not surprising that § 1983 has quickly become such a major part of the 
federal judicial docket that Federal Courts no longer can give full and 
meaningful pedagogical consideration to this area.  The material demands its 
own, more practically oriented course. 
II.  TEACHING CIVIL RIGHTS 
The question is what material to cover in Civil Rights—a course designed 
to give a complete presentation of the doctrinal and policy issues in § 1983, 
going into far greater detail than in the typical Federal Courts class.  The 
course is best divided into seven subjects, roughly following the chronological 
flow of issues arising in a typical § 1983 action.  Most of the main casebooks 
are organized (in varying order) along these major subjects. 
 
 42. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)) (“The very essence of 
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”). 
 43. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  See also William B. 
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599–60 (1999) (exploring the 
advantages of bringing civil rights claims in state courts in the context of gay rights). 
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A. Basic Elements of Constitutional Claims: State Action 
We begin with claims against individual officers and the requirement that 
the defendant act “under color”44 of state law, which roughly corresponds to 
the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.45  We start with 
Monroe and its expansive interpretation of the concept to reach public officials 
whose conduct violates state law but who nevertheless were “clothed” with the 
authority (or apparent authority) of state law such that their actions were 
“made possible” only by their positions under state law.46 
We then turn to a different state action issue—when private individuals or 
entities are deemed to act under color of state law by virtue of some joint or 
coordinated action with government, such that the private entity becomes 
subject to constitutional liability.47  This doctrine was particularly vigorous 
during the Civil Rights Era, although it has made something of a comeback in 
recent years.48  The recent trend towards privatizing governmental functions 
has increased the issue’s significance.49 
While many Federal Courts casebooks include Monroe as a major case, a 
full discussion of the “under color” element is beyond the scope of that class.  
But it is central to a complete understanding of constitutional litigation: who 
can (and should) be sued for a constitutional violation, and who is subject to 
constitutional limits and possible constitutional liability. 
B. Basic Elements of Constitutional Claims: Rights, Privileges, and 
Immunities 
The second element of a § 1983 claim is a deprivation of a “right[], 
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws.”50  The starting 
point is Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, including 
incorporated Bill of Rights provisions against state and local governments, as 
well as liability for tort-like outrageous executive misconduct.51  Then comes 
 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 45. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982). 
 46. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184–85 (1961) (citations omitted); Gilles, supra note 
35, at 53–54; Michael L. Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. 
REV. 1097, 1103–04 (1985). 
 47. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–97 
(2001); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 926–29; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 
(1961). 
 48. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of Things Past? Reflections on the Warren 
Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 1064–65 (2002). 
 49. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (accepting, implicitly, that 
private company acted under color of federal law in operating federal prisons); Jody Freeman, 
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–56 (2000). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 51. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998). 
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procedural due process, with particular consideration of underlying structural 
federalism issues and the effect of available post-deprivation state judicial 
remedies on federal due process claims.52  The connection between due 
process and state remedies makes these claims different than other 
constitutional-rights claims, as to which the availability of state-law remedies 
is irrelevant.53 
Next, we consider the “and laws” language of § 1983 and its use to 
vindicate violations of federal statutes, which raises unique issues of separation 
of powers.54  Finally, we consider the relationship between § 1983 
constitutional claims and other federal civil rights statutes and when a 
substance-specific statute, often containing its own detailed remedial scheme, 
precludes a constitutional claim (under Bivens or § 1983) for the same 
conduct.55 
C. Claims Against Federal Officials 
We briefly detour to discuss Bivens, the judge-made federal parallel to § 
1983.56  This section covers the Court’s decision in Bivens itself, as well as 
recent cases applying the “factors counseling hesitation” concept to limit 
availability of Bivens actions in many circumstances.57  One key point here is 
the disconnect between the claims that can be pursued against state and local 
officers under § 1983 as opposed to against federal officers; underlying that is 
the issue of the relative powers of Congress and courts and which is the 
appropriate source of any cause of action for pursuing constitutional claims. 
D. Individual Officer Defenses 
The focus of the course then shifts from plaintiff to defendant by 
introducing the immunity defenses available to all individual, state, and federal 
 
 52. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S 
327, 330–32 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 
 53. Cf. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 54. Compare Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1980) (recognizing that § 1983 vehicle 
can be used to remedy violations of federal statutes), with Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
284–87 (2002) (tying answer to congressional intent in underlying statute).  I spend time in 
Federal Courts teaching implied statutory rights of action.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 293 (2001). This is the flipside, which I mention briefly in a Federal Courts course, 
only to show the connection between the doctrines.  Thiboutot also allows exploration of the 
jurisdictional question of where courts get the power to hear § 1983 claims.  448 U.S. at 7–8 n.6; 
compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), with id. § 1343(a)(3) (2006). 
 55. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 793–97 (2009). 
 56. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (quoting Hartman v. 
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)) (describing Bivens as the “federal analog” to § 1983). 
 57. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550–68 (2007). 
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officer defendants—absolute legislative,58 judicial,59 and prosecutorial60 
immunity, as well as the default executive qualified immunity.61  These 
affirmative defenses are the flipside to the elements of the plaintiff’s claim; 
they apply only when the plaintiff has established (or at least pled) a violation 
of rights under color of law that should entitle her to recovery.62 
E. Governmental Liability 
The course then moves from claims against individual officer defendants 
to claims against governmental-entity defendants, with different rules applying 
to different levels of government. 
For local governments, this means Monell and the Byzantine doctrine of 
municipal liability.  Government is not subject to vicarious liability merely 
because one of its officers acts in an unconstitutional manner.63  A local 
government is liable for misconduct occurring pursuant to formal policy 
established by a policymaker, for conduct engaged in by a “policymaker,” or 
for deliberate failure of policymakers to train, supervise, control, or otherwise 
manage their inferior officers.64 
For state governments, this discussion leads to the Eleventh Amendment 
and state sovereign immunity, another subject typically covered in depth in 
Federal Courts.  This overlap presents a dilemma I am still working through.  
One approach is to excise sovereign immunity entirely from Federal Courts 
(beyond a brief primer) and place the entire subject into Civil Rights.  At some 
level this makes sense because the real Eleventh Amendment action now 
centers on the scope of Congress’ powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, making it a clean fit for a course on litigating constitutional and 
statutory public law rights.65  And § 1983/Bivens66 and Ex Parte Young67 share 
a common theme—litigation is targeted primarily at individual officers 
 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1998) (citing 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–75 (1951)). 
 59. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1992) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526 (1985)). 
 60. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 859–61 (2009). 
 61. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
807–08 (1982). 
 62. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818–22 (2009); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); 
Am. Fire, Theft, & Collisions Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 63. Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 64. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997) (citations omitted); 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) 
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). 
 65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006); 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518, 520 (2004). 
 66. See supra Part II.C. 
 67. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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(“persons”) rather than government entities. Alternatively, we could cover the 
Eleventh Amendment in both classes, but narrow the focus in Civil Rights.  
Following a broad overview of the Eleventh Amendment,68 Civil Rights would 
examine the link between the Eleventh Amendment and constitutional 
litigation, including whether states are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983,69 
the extent to which states can be directly sued and held liable for constitutional 
violations,70 and the role of Ex Parte Young. 
We finish this part with two issues that bridge pure individual liability with 
entity liability.  The first is supervisory liability and the rules for holding 
higher-level officials individually responsible for the misconduct of their 
underlings on the ground.71  The second is the often-difficult task of dividing 
and distinguishing state from local government and local government 
functions.  Litigants and courts often must determine whether a particular 
officer defendant works for local government (in which case the government 
entity might be liable on a Monell claim, on a proper showing) or for the state 
(in which case entity liability is unavailable).72  The second is an important 
aspect of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, but again is understandable only 
within the full context of a focus on § 1983. 
F. Procedural Hurdles 
The next part of the course examines a series of procedural hurdles that 
plaintiffs must overcome to prevail on § 1983 actions.  Some of these hurdles 
are covered in Federal Courts, others are not.  Again, however, the key is the 
contextualized and practical coverage in the stand-alone course.  If the 
overriding theme of Civil Rights is how individuals vindicate (or do not 
vindicate) constitutional rights, this section considers the many unexpected 
hurdles to that vindication. 
First is the requirement of exhaustion of state judicial and administrative 
remedies as a prerequisite to bringing federal constitutional claims.73  Second 
is the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey,74 and whether particular constitutional 
rights can be asserted through § 1983 (which does not require exhaustion of 
state remedies) or must be asserted only through Habeas Corpus (which does 
 
 68. For an ideal case surveying the overall doctrinal landscape of the Eleventh Amendment, 
although not a § 1983 case, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 69. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U.S. 332, 342–44 (1979). 
 70. See generally United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
 71. Of course, there is some question whether supervisory liability still exists. See Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948–49 (2009) (“[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to 
Bivens and § 1983 suits . . . .”); see also id. at 1957–58 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 72. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786–89 (1997). 
 73. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). 
 74. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] CIVIL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL COURTS 833 
require exhaustion of state processes).75  This triggers an important side 
discussion on the effectiveness of § 1983 as a vehicle for remedying 
constitutional violations occurring within state criminal proceedings, especially 
for violations leading to wrongful convictions and claims of actual innocence.  
It also requires a brief lecture on the contours of Habeas Corpus.76 
Next comes issue and claim preclusion and the extent to which legal and 
factual conclusions in state proceedings (civil, criminal, or administrative) are 
binding on a subsequent federal constitutional claim brought in federal court.77  
This allows discussion of litigation strategy, the overlap between federal and 
state claims, and the right (and occasional need) to bring claims together in one 
action in some court.  Lastly, we examine the intersection of all these 
procedural issues, as well as statutes of limitations, through the decision in 
Wallace v. Kato,78 which considered the accrual date and timeliness of Fourth 
Amendment claims in an actual-innocence/wrongful prosecution case. 
The next procedural hurdle is abstention, covered in great detail in Federal 
Courts and more narrowly here.  Consider several important points about 
covering abstention in Civil Rights.  First, there is some debate among teachers 
as to whether abstention should be covered in the course, and only one of the 
major casebooks includes it.79  Second, discussion can be limited only to the 
two abstention doctrines most frequently in play in § 1983 litigation—Pullman 
and Younger.  Third, the discussion in Civil Rights ties the conversation less to 
the structural question of the judicial power to abstain and more tightly to the 
history and purpose of § 1983, Congress’ intent in creating that litigation 
vehicle, and whether abstention is consistent with that statutory purpose.80  
Finally, abstention permits discussion of unique procedural issues related to 
 
 75. Id. at 480–81. 
 76. Habeas is included in some Civil Rights casebooks.  See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 
34, at 427. It is similarly specialized and complicated—too much for full inclusion in this course 
beyond a basic outline lecture that enables students to see the connections between habeas and § 
1983 as vehicles for pressing federal constitutional claims.  Again, I believe Habeas demands its 
own third course, independent of both Federal Courts and Civil Rights Litigation.  See supra note 
17 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Migra v. Warren Sch. Dist. Bd. Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 75–76 (1984); Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96–97 (1980). 
 78. 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 
 79. See EISENBERG, supra note 34, at 547. A second Civil Rights book is an offshoot of the 
LOW & JEFFRIES Federal Courts casebook.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., PAMELA S. KARLAN, 
PETER W. LOW & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2007). This book does not include abstention, but the publishers permit 
teachers to pull material from one book to use with the other.  Id. at iii–xviii. 
 80. See Wells, supra note 16, at 1097–98. 
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prospective relief under § 1983, including declaratory judgments81 and three-
judge district courts.82 
G. Remedies 
We finish the course with the remedies that a plaintiff can recover if she 
proves the elements of her basic claim and overcomes the immunity defenses 
and procedural hurdles—in other words, after everything we have discussed up 
to this point of the course.  Remedies include damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
injunctive relief (including structural or positive institutional-reform 
injunctions), all considered in light of the policies of § 1983 litigation.  For 
example, we consider that there is no recovery for the intrinsic value of 
constitutional rights, meaning big money is not in play in many actions and 
plaintiffs often are limited to nominal damages.83  In considering attorneys’ 
fees, we discuss the concept of the  “Private Attorney General” and the 
congressional goal and public benefit derived from increasing civil rights 
enforcement through individual damages litigation.84  We also consider the 
extent to which attorneys’ fees have become an intrinsically valuable remedy 
that imposes its own deterrence on government misconduct. 
III.  CONCLUSION: CONNECTING FEDERAL COURTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
Because I teach both courses, my interest in Civil Rights Litigation affects 
my approach to Federal Courts and vice versa. My goal is to avoid unnecessary 
redundancy and to create a genuine two-course sequence with distinct parts 
and themes, while making both work as stand-alone courses.  To the extent 
possible, I cover none of the core Civil Rights material described in Part II in 
my Federal Courts class, leaving it entirely for Civil Rights. I ignore the details 
of § 1983, Bivens, individual immunity, and Monell.  I teach abstention in both 
classes, but more broadly in Federal Courts, covering all abstention doctrines, 
not only those typically applicable to § 1983 litigation.  Most recently, I 
entirely omitted the Eleventh Amendment from Federal Courts.  That last 
move was less about overlap and repetition than about the need for more time 
 
 81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
 82. Id. § 2284; Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-
Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
 83. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731–36 (1989); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 266–67 (1978). 
 84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602–10 (2001); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney 
General” Is—And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004). 
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in Federal Courts to cover other material.  But the topic becomes expendable 
precisely because Civil Rights is in the curriculum to pick up the slack.85 
The final issue is sequencing.  Pedagogically, my inclination is to move 
from the general to the specific, so I recommend that students take Federal 
Courts to be introduced to the doctrine, principles, and themes before looking 
at them in the specific § 1983 context.86  On the other hand, Wells argues that 
understanding specific § 1983 doctrine enables students to better grasp the 
general ethereal principles and concepts of Federal Courts, meaning students 
will get more out of the theory of Federal Courts if they have seen the 
principles in action in the specific course first.87 
Ultimately, sequencing matters less than the broader point that Civil Rights 
Litigation must have space alongside Federal Courts in the law school 
curriculum.  Both should be part of pedagogical immersion in the world of 
federal public law litigation for all students interested in clerking, in practicing 
public law and constitutional litigation in federal court, or simply in 
understanding the process for vindicating civil rights. 
  
 
 85. In Fed Courts, I assigned a five-page primer on the doctrine and did a ten-minute 
summary lecture that largely served as a trailer for the civil rights course or a basic grounding for 
Bar Review. 
 86. Wells might say that I fall into the trap of many Federal Courts teachers.  Wells, supra 
note 16, at 860–61. 
 87. Id. at 867. 
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